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FICTIONAL THREATENING:  
THE CASE OF DISJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS 
In the present paper, we extend previous work on the speech act of threatening by 
including in our analysis a corpus of crime fiction based on 700 English books, 
a characteristic trait of which are threats. By including data derived from written 
narratives in prose, imaginary rather than factual, this research aims to identify 
potential differences between fictional and authentic threats, thus contributing to the 
general panorama of this speech act. Here we concentrate on a single construction, 
known as disjunctive conditional or pseudo‑imperative, which is analysed in terms of 
parameters employed in previous studies and modified to meet the purposes on the 
present research.  
Keywords: threatening, speech act, corpus, fiction, crime stories, pseudo-
‑imperatives, disjunctive conditional  
1. Introduction 
Po tym przykrym doświadczeniu nie przestała czerpać przyjemności z czytania, jednak 
zrozumiała, że rzeczywistość nie dorasta do książek. Taki las – ot, drzewa, liście, krzaki, 
zwierzęta. A w książce – poetyckie cuda, zachwyty. […] I Anna rozumie już, że to nie 
książki, kłamią, lecz życie. (Szczepan Twardoch,  Anna) 
After that unpleasant experience, she did not stop enjoying reading but understood that 
reality was no match for books. Take a forest – nothing but trees, leaves, bushes, animals. 
While in the book – poetic wonders, miracles. [...] And Anna knows now that it is not 
books that lie, but life (Translation, AŁ). 
In the present paper we are far from claiming that life cannot compare to 
books; neither do we advocate the opposite view. We argue that an analysis of 
fictional texts is likely to provide the analysts with substantial evidence 
of linguistic constructions that are either hardly attested in the real world or are 
indicative of partial compatibility of verbal interaction taking place in the 
world of facts and in the world of fiction. According to Austin (1962), we 
speak to do things, which is a reason why we are interested in how the same 
things are done by real and fictional speakers. To this purpose, we extend 
previous works on the topic of the speech act of threatening by including in our 
analysis a corpus of crime fiction, a characteristic trait of which is the very act 
of threatening.  
Most of the existing studies on threats and threatening language can be 
described as “armchair approaches”, i.e. “approaches that do not analyse actual 
language data but work with reflections on language” (Jucker 2009: 1615). And 
in a sense, so is ours. Yet, while sitting in our armchairs, we are analysing 
actual data, i.e. not fictive but fictional ones, derived from a corpus of crime 
(and detective) stories. Furthermore, a substantial part of the analysed material 
can be placed at the interface of fiction and reality, being an artistic 
transposition of real events closed in a narrative form. Whatever the role of 
imagination, be it a reflection of personal beliefs, or fears and desires, we hope 
that a study into 700 books may offer a new insight into threatening and its 
linguistic forms.  
The aim of the present study is twofold. First, we aim to expand on the 
results of previous corpus‑based studies on threats. By concentrating on a specific 
syntactic construction associated with the act of threatening, i.e. pseudo-
‑imperatives or Imperative‑or‑Declarative (henceforth IoD) structures, we intend 
to find out to what extent the constructions match the general multifactorial 
model proposed by Muschalik (2018). Second, by including data derived from 
written narratives in prose, imaginary rather than factual, this research aims to 
identify potential differences between fictional and authentic threats. Thus, by 
including the written fictional language, the study aspires to capture more of the 
heterogeneity of human communication, here restricted to the English language, 
and thereby, to shed light on the uses of IoD patterns in the performance of 
threatening and on the correlation of various constitutive factors of this speech 
act. Previous research, limited as it is, has in fact found that even if there is no 
one standard way of performing a threat, some aspects of the form of threat are 
more systematic than previously contended. Among these, an important 
discriminatory function is played by conditional language, which, although 
frequently characterized as a defining feature, has been found in Muschalik 
(2018: 173) to be relatively infrequent in the corpus of authentic threat 
utterances, yet salient enough in terms of its functional associations. The 
syntactic forms that “conditional language” can take are numerous and they 
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range from true conditionals of if…then type to (don’t) do it or. And it is the last 
of these forms that we concentrate on to assess its place and contribution to the 
general panorama of conditional threats. 
2. Threatening as a speech act: dilemmas 
Unlike the flagship example of promising as a speech act, the speech act of 
threatening did not receive considerable attention in Austin’s (1962) How to do 
things with words. However, the few mentions of threat(ening) that Austin 
offered clearly signalled potential problems that the general theory of speech acts 
could be confronted with. 
First, Austin (1962: 130) suggests that the verb threat can be used as a direct 
speech act, i.e. following the canonical performative formula “I Verbpresent 
indicative (you)”. In this way, Austin delegates it to the class of performative verbs, 
the site of such nonproblematic performative members as warn and promise. 
This membership has been questioned, however, in the subsequent literature. For 
authors such as Nicoloff (1989: 501) “there does not seem to be any con-
ventional (bold type ours) expression that corresponds to or counts as the making 
of a threat”, which does not invalidate Austin’s claim on the acceptability of 
“I threaten you” but questions its canonical status. Salgueiro (2010) rules out the 
performative use of “threaten” in the first person singular of the present 
indicative active. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the possibility of using such 
semi‑performative utterances as ”Yes, I am threatening”1 and, which is more 
commonplace, parenthetical remarks, “That’s a threat”2. This claim finds 
a partial confirmation in our Corpus of Crime Fiction (henceforth: CCF), which 
provides two examples of the speakers’ speech‑act‑classifying utterances but not 
a single instance of the semi‑performative formula mentioned by Salgueiro:  
(1) “That’s an awfully strange question. One that might be misconstrued as 
a threat.”  
“A threat? That was not a threat,” he said with a laugh. “But this is a threat.” 
He moved one step closer. “We have you severely outnumbered. Lay down 
your weapons or you will have a new answer to my question about pain.” 
Secondly, Austin (1962: 121) observes that not only does the very act of 
threatening satisfy the performative formula, but it is acceptable in utterances 
1 The performative status of such utterances cannot be accepted. In his analysis of the 
performative verb “bet” Levinson (1983) interprets sentences in the progressive aspect such as 
I am betting you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow as reminders and not performative utterances 
capable of doing betting. 
2 “That’s a threat” is not performative but functions as a description of the preceding utterance. 
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such as “In saying I would shoot him I was threatening him”, which is found to 
be a sufficient condition to qualify it as an illocutionary act rather than 
a perlocutionary one. However, this has been challenged in numerous studies to 
follow. Nicoloff (1989: 501–502) argues that threats cannot be classified as 
illocutionary acts because even if they are “similar to orders or congratulations in 
that in their case, too, the saying is seen as constituting the doing, not as bringing 
it about as a consequence, as in the case of perlocutions, […] there does not seem 
to be any conventional (bold type ours) expression that corresponds to or counts 
as the making of a threat”, thus providing the same argument as above. For 
Nicoloff, the absence of such a conventional expression is regarded as the major 
obstacle for “the conventionalistic interpretation of the class of illocutionary 
speech acts” (Walton 2000: 109). Accordingly, Nicoloff proposes that threats 
should be expelled from the class of illocutionary verbs and placed among 
perlocutions.  
The third major problem that threats pose concerns their membership in 
Searle’s (1976) typology of speech acts. Searle distinguished five classes of 
speech acts, namely, representatives, directives, commissives, expressives, and 
declarations. Threats appear together with promises in the general category of 
commissives, whose illocutionary force consists in committing the speaker to 
a future course of action, as in “I promise to be there tomorrow”. This 
membership of threats in the class of commissives has been repeatedly 
questioned on the grounds that there are numerous differences between these 
two speech acts concerning not only their form, but also “commissiveness” of 
threats understood as an obligation assumed by the speaker. First, while the act of 
promising generates for the speaker an obligation to keep his/her promise, the act 
of threatening puts on the threatening party no such obligation, i.e. the threat 
‘Freeze, or I’ll shoot’ would still count as a threat even if the person threatened 
moves and the threatener decides not to shoot. Secondly, as Salgueiro (2010) 
emphasises, unlike threats but like betting, promises “are essentially inter-
subjective speech acts, the performance of which involves the active joint 
participation of both speaker and receiver” while “threats are more unilateral”, by 
which Salgueiro means that promises, but not threats, can be deactivated by the 
addressee: 
(2) If you marry me, I will treat you like a queen.  
Your Majesty, thank you, but there is no need. I wish to remain Cinderella. 
(3) Marry me I said or I will break your nose. 
? Thanks, but there is no need.” 
Finally, the form of elementary threats such “I will kill you before you arrive 
home” opens up the possibility for classifying threats as assertives.  
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It is not our objective to address the problem of possible failings of the 
traditional versions of Searle’s speech act theory and we embarked on this review 
of major reservations about “commissiveness” of threats mainly to demonstrate 
that the speech act of threatening can be accomplished by a variety of forms. Of 
these, at least for the purposes of the present study, two general forms are 
important: commissive conditional promises/threats and directive‑commissive 
conditional ones, which are discussed in the section below. 
3. Conditionality and conditionals 
As signalled before, there is a well‑recognised, or at least frequently alluded to, 
association between the speech act of threatening and its formal exponents. This has 
been constantly shown in numerous studies, of which the overwhelming majority 
are based primarily on introspection. Among the early studies following the 
publication of Austin’s How to do things with words, Kent (1967: 31) observes that 
In situations which can be analyzed in terms of (“co operative”) formal games, the 
statement may be that “I’ll choose this alternative if you choose that alternative”. In 
bargaining situations, a commonly encountered kind of threat is that in which the 
threatener says he will take a given action if a certain agreement (or one which would be 
even better for the threatener) is not obtained, thus suggesting that the conditional form is 
at least one of the most common ones. 
In the same vein, yet far from the theory of bargaining, Milburn and Watman 
(1981: 8) state that “A threat traditionally has been defined as some variation of 
the following formula: “If you do A, I will do B, where ‘A’ is detrimental to the 
threatener and ‘B’ is detrimental to the target.” 
The canonical character of conditionality in the speech act of threatening has 
also been pointed out by Fraser, who notes that a typical “threat takes the form of 
a declaration in which the speaker is presented as the agent, with a condition 
possibly present” (Fraser 1998: 165). It is also in the same work that he states 
explicitly that “most direct verbal threats are conditional: either the addressee is 
to satisfy some condition(s), or the speaker will bring about an unfavourable state 
of the world” (Fraser 1998: 167). A similar observation is made in Salgueiro’s 
discussion of formal parallelism between promises and threats (Salgueiro 2010), 
mentioned above. For these speech acts, Salgueiro identifies two common 
patterns: commissive conditional (CC) and directive conditional (DC):  
(4) If one day I become capo di tutti capi I will make your life unbearable. (CC) 
(5) If you don’t make sure he doesn’t step out of line again, I’ll kill ’im. (DC) 
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Commenting on similar threat/promise patterns, Salgueiro (2010: 217) 
argues that in the CC threats the speaker’s future action of the speaker depends 
on whether a condition is satisfied, yet “the main objective of the threat or 
promise or threat is not to get R to bring about the satisfaction, of that condition” 
as normally it is independent of the receivers’ will and power. Consequently, (4) 
≠ I want you to help me become capo di tutti capi. And then I will make your life 
unbearable. 
In contrast, in the DC threats and promises, Salgueiro (2010: 218) continues, 
“the main illocutionary point is directive” and the commitment of the speaker to 
a future action does not depend on satisfying the specified condition, “but on the 
receiver’s bringing about that”, which is why (5) = I want fulfilment: you to 
make sure he doesn’t step out of line again. Otherwise I’ll kill ’im. 
The fact that the implicative “if‑then” form as the most common realisation 
of threats is often taken for granted or simply presumed to be the central one 
should not lead to underestimation of other threat patterns. The more that 
Tedeschi (1970: 159) considers “if‑then” only an attempt “to constitute an 
objective criterion for identifying threats.”  
Even if Limberg (2009) states explicitly that there is no standardized format 
of threats, conditionality is still placed among the most common features of 
threats. The presence of this component is reflected both in various dictionary 
definitions of the concept and in scarce linguistic research outside the area of 
lexicography. As for the former, Longman Dictionary defines threat as 
“a statement in which you tell someone that you will cause them harm or 
trouble if they do not do what you want” (bold type ours) and OED explicates its 
meaning as a “denunciation to a person of ill to befall him; esp. a declaration of 
hostile determination or of loss, pain, punishment, or damage to be inflicted in 
retribution for or conditionally upon some course; a menace” (bold type ours). 
Within the linguistic literature there has not been much research con-
centrating on the realisation of the concept of conditionality as an element of 
threatening, in spite of the fact that in numerous “armchair analyses”, 
conditionally phrased threats are the epitome of threatening utterances. Among 
a few empirical studies accommodating the factor of conditionality as a recurrent 
component of threats, a note must be made of the threatening communication 
survey among over 100 university students undertaken by Gales (2011), who 
concludes that threats are accomplished in a variety of ways ranging from direct 
statements, as in “I will smash your fucking face” to more indirect ones, as in the 
conditional sentence “If you don’t tell me where she is, I will bleed you like 
a pig”. Interestingly, Gales has noticed a discrepancy between the informants’ 
beliefs on frequency of conditionality in threats (54 per cent) and her actual 
findings in the corpus (26 per cent). 
The largest truly empirical study of the association between the conditional 
and the speech act of threatening was conducted by Muschalik (2018), who 
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examined a corpus of authentic American English threat utterances obtained 
from naturally occurring speech and writing. Muschalik (2018: 172) shares 
Gales’s view on the superior status of conditionality in threats only to a limited 
extent as she claims that in her analysis, conditionality “did not reach the status 
of a conventional component of threatening language in general” if measured in 
terms of its frequency, but “when the relevance of a feature is to be understood as 
the feature’s discriminatory power, the prominent mentioning of the feature (i.e. 
conditionality) in the literature appears to be justified.” In her study conditional 
language was found in about 29 per cent of all threats.  
The significance of conditionality in threatening has also been confirmed by 
Nini (2017). In her corpus analysis of malicious forensic texts, including threats, 
she applied the multidimensional model introduced in Biber (1988; 1989) and 
found out that conditional threats accounted for as much as 37 per cent of the 
total corpus and that high scores on Biber’s Dimension 4, the Dimension of Overt 
Expression of Persuasion, corresponded to a more frequent use of means of 
expressing modality that can be found in “if‑then” conditional threats. Similar 
observations on the role of direct‑conditional threats have been made in Glukhov 
and Martynova (2015) and Goshkheteliani and Churchelauri (2019).  
All these empirical studies have demonstrated not only that conditionality is 
a prominent characteristic of threatening but also that threatening language can 
do without explicit conditionality. Indeed, apart from the “if‑then” propositions, 
there are “conditionals in disguise” (Rescher 2007:14): 
“Should he come, I’m out of here” comes sufficiently close to count as a variantly 
formulated conditional. And “This button operates that light” is effectively equivalent 
with “If you push this button, that light will switch its on/off state.” “Whenever it rains, it 
pours” comes to: “If it rains, it also pours” and “Wherever he goes, they follow him” 
comes to: “If he goes someplace, they follow him.” “Membership in the club requires 
a fee” comes to “If someone is to join the club, then this individual must pay 
a membership fee.” Again, “Doing X successfully requires a great effort” in effect comes 
to “If one is to succeed at doing X, one will have to exert a great effort.” Even merely 
descriptive statements can carry an essentially conditional message. “Dogs are 
mammals” to all intents and purposes comes to “If a creature is a dog, then it is 
a mammal.”  
However, even this list does not exhaust all possibilities as conditionality is 
not restricted to assertions. Although the prototypical form of conditionals in 
English takes the format of assertive “if‑then”, i.e. two clauses, of which one is 
an antecedent (protasis) marked with if and the other one is ‘a consequent’ 
(apodosis) occasionally marked with then (von Fintel 2011: 1516), conditional 
meaning can be conveyed with other means such as other items governing 
content clause protasis, as in (6), inversion (7), constructions with phrases rather 
FICTIONAL THREATENING: THE CASE OF DISJUNCTIVE... 213 
than clauses (8), and finally coordinate and juxtaposed constructions with 
conditional interpretations (9) (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 758–59): 
(6) Country people love to talk to the stranger, provided he shows a sincere 
interest in their anecdotes.  
(7) Were she to do so, the studio threatened that she would never work in 
Hollywood again.  
(8) Without her, I would be a different man, with a different life.  
(9) (Either you) Get your ass gone or I’ll assault you myself. 
In the present paper we shall focus on the last of these conditional structures, 
which is sometimes referred to as pseudo‑imperatives (Clark 1993; van Rooij & 
Franke 2012) and IoD‑and IaD‑constructions (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 937; 
Kaufmann 2012: 221). Our focus is on IoDs (Imperative or Declarative), yet to 
demonstrate fully the syntactic and semantic potential of IoD, it is essential to 
adopt a comparative perspective and discuss IoD and IaD (Imperative and 
Declarative) together. 
4. IoD and IaD conditionals 
In a comprehensive survey of constructions with a conditional meaning, 
Quirk et al. (1986: 931–33) discuss the conditional interpretation of sequences of 
clauses combined by means of the coordinator and: 
(10) Give me some money and (then) I’ll help you escape.  
which they interpret as: 
(11) Give me some money. If you give me some money (then) I’ll help you 
escape. 
Unlike in the case of prototypical examples of if‑then conditional sentences, 
where both clauses take a declarative form, in IaD constructions the first clause is 
a directive and “the second clause describes the consequence which will ensue if 
the directive is obeyed” (Quirk 1986: 931). Similarly, IoD constructions such as: 
(12) Give me some money or (else) I’ll shoot. 
take the same directive form in the protasis followed by a declarative clause in 
the apodosis. However, unlike IaD constructions, they imply a negative 
condition and can be paraphrased as: 
(13) Give me some money. If you don’t give me some money I’ll shoot. 
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This observation allows Quirk et al. (1986) to argue that “the conditional use 
of or is thus the negative analogue of the conditional use of and” and that “unlike 
and, or typically follows a negative imperative clause”: 
(14) Don’t be too long, or you’ll miss the bus. 
In the context of the present paper, the most interesting observation that 
Quirk et al. (1986) offer is that the conditional use of both or and and “is 
associated with certain directive speech acts, such as promises and threats”. This 
view is shared by Kaufmann (2012: 221), for whom IoD- and IaD‑constructions 
are likely to receive a conditional‑like interpretation when the protasis is 
imperative, and the apodosis is declarative.” 
While none of the above claims cannot be rejected, the relationship between 
the form and the order of IoD and IoD clauses does matter. Van der Auwera 
(1986) notices an intriguing pragmatic asymmetry in the following patterns: 
(15) Close the window and I will kill you. (A and P-) 
(16) Close the window and I will kiss you. (A and P+) 
(17) Close the window or I will kill you. (A and P-) 
(18) ? Close the window or I will kiss you. (A and P+). 
What the four sentences have in common is their association with conditional 
assertive force. According to Franke (2005:1) “the declarative sentence in IaD 
makes an assertion only about those situations in which the content referred to by 
the imperative sentence holds”, which contrasts sharply with IoDs, in which “the 
declarative sentence of an IoD makes an assertion only about those situations in 
which the content referred to by the imperative sentence does not hold.” Apart 
from the assertive force, all the sentences exhibit a directive force. However not 
in all cases does the directive force agree with the force of the plain infinitive. In 
(16) and (17), the IaD and IoD have the same directive force as the plain 
imperative “Close the window” whereas (15) directs the opposite of the plain 
imperative form, i.e. “Close the window” should be interpreted as “Don’t close 
the window” (if you don’t want to be killed). It might be expected then that the 
symmetrical balance between positive (16) and (17) and negative (15) should be 
maintained by a negative interpretation of (18). However, quite unexpectedly it is 
not the case, as (18) is simply pragmatically infelicitous regardless of its positive 
or negative interpretation (for proposed solutions see, e.g. Franke, 2005 and 
2008; van Rooij, R., and M. Franke 2012). Thus, the set of IaDs and IoDs 
becomes restricted to three cases of utterances, two of which contain conditional 
threats and only one conditional promise. In further sections, we will focus on 
conditional threats of IoD type and their instantiations in the CCF. 
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5. The Study 
5.1. Analytic parameters  
Our classification model makes use of a feature‑assignment scheme, in 
which all tokens were marked up for the presence or absence of several features 
discussed below. To ensure the comparability of our results with the results 
achieved in Muschalik (2018), we included as many parameters employed in her 
analysis as possible and rejected those for which the presence/absence value 
predictably followed from the syntax and morphology of IoDs. In addition, new 
parameters were proposed. In what follows, we present these analytic parameters. 
5.1.1. CONDITIONALITY 
Muschalik (2018: 59) defines conditionality as a construction “consisting of 
a protasis p and an apodosis q, conjoined with either the conjunction if, or with 
the conjunction and, or the disjunction or”, the former being referred to as 
explicit conditionals and the latter as implicit ones. Additionally, she identifies 
nonconditional threats. Clearly, all our IoDs representing syndetic or-
‑coordination, meet the second condition and for this reason should be classified 
as implicit conditional threats. However, it should be noted that not only syndetic 
IoDs (19) but also asyndetic ID (20) may have a conditional interpretation: 
(19) Don’t move, or I’ll shoot. 
(20) Don’t move. I’ll shoot. 
and consequently could be included in our study. Not rejecting the possibility of 
a conditional interpretation, we decided to exclude asyndetic constructions from 
our analysis.  
5.1.2. FUTURITY  
Futurity has often been indicated as a salient linguistic feature of threats 
(Yamanaka 1995; Fraser 1998; Gales 2010; Salgueiro 2010: Muschalik, 2018, 
Bojsen‑Møller et al. 2020), often being indicative also of the speaker’s intention. 
For Salgueiro (2010: 2–7), futurity is an indispensable element since being 
commissive speech acts “both elementary promises and elementary threats must 
describe a future action or omission, or a sequence of such actions or omissions, 
by the speaker.” In the present paper, we understand FUTURITY as a reference to 
a future action (or its omission) performed by an agent or the affected. 
Muschalik (2018) proposes a quadripartite system of classification of 
temporal orientation of the act of threatening, i.e. will‑futurity, be going 
to‑futurity, present futurate, and finally, no futurity, which in broad terms can be 
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reduced to the opposition futurity vs. no futurity. In our analysis, we follow this 
classification with certain amendments. We distinguish between will/shall-
‑futurity (21), be‑going futurity (22), the contracted form ‘ll (23), present futurate 
(24), and no futurity, as in: 
(21) Cease your investigations or you will get her back in pieces. 
(22) Do it, or I am going to fuck you up. 
(23) Stop faffing about or I'll be forced to get von Trotha on yer arse. 
(24) Go to the corner or I take you into the bathroom and cuff you to the drain 
trap under the sink.  
5.1.3. VIOLENT VERBS  
Detrimentality of the action communicated in a threat to the target is 
a defining feature of this act. This property of threats has been referred to in the 
literature also as an unfavourable action (Fraser 1998), undesirable action 
(Limberg 2009), harmful action (Napier and Mardigian (2003) or simply harm 
(Wohlrapp 1991; Salgueiro 2010; Bojsen‑Møller et al. 2020). Among other 
terminological labels there can be found also more neutral undesirability of an 
action (Franke 2008).  
The range of detrimental actions is very wide and in most general terms, 
detrimental actions comprise physical or psychological/social injury, loss or 
damage as well as actions negatively affecting or deteriorating the situation of the 
patient as of the moment of threat. 
Rather than refer to the general category of detrimentality and its linguistic 
realisations irrespective of their form, Muschalik (2018), following Gales (2010), 
focuses on verbs denoting violent actions. Her tripartite classification system 
includes the categories of violent (25), ambiguous (26), and non‑violent verbs 
(27), or more precisely, verbal phrases, such as kill, be sorry and be responsible, 
respectively. The first class is further divided into four subclasses on the basis of 
Levin‘s verb classes (Levin 1993). In this analysis, only the three general 
parameters of VIOLENT VERB will be used employed: 
(24) Now calm down or I’m going to have to slap you, like in the movies, where 
the guy who   
gets slapped goes, thanks, I needed that  
(25) I want the IRS off Scott Coleman’s back by tomorrow morning, or I am 
going to make   
someone’s life miserable. 
(26) You cooperate or I take you in for questioning. 
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5.1.4. TABOO LANGUAGE 
Another feature deemed typical of threatening is the use of offensive 
language. Gales’s survey among over 100 respondents has shown that after 
conditionality, using profane language is the category most frequently associated 
with threats (Gales 2010). The link between vulgar language and threats has been 
corroborated in several other studies, including the corpus‑based study by 
Muschalik (2018). Muschalik analyses instances of vulgar language under the 
heading “Taboo language” and her coding system assumes five distinct 
functional categories such as personal insult (mother fucker), expletive (fuck), 
empathic intensifiers (fucking idiot), verbal forms (I’ll fuck you), and idiomatic 
set phrases (I don’t give a fuck). For the purposes of our study, we use a binary 
feature scheme involving only the categories of presence (28) and absence (29) 
of TABOO LANGUAGE in all analysed tokens of threatening: 
(28) Get out of the fucking car, or I will kill you, I’ll shoot you here and now! 
(29) Steer clear until I’m done, or I’ll be using this brush on you. 
5.1.5. USE OF WEAPON 
Another feature that is closely associated with threatening language is the use 
of lexical items denoting weapons. In their risk assessment study Turner and Gelles 
(2003) claim that the mention of weaponry is indicative of the type and degree of 
violence to be inflicted by the threatener. Also Muschalik (2018) includes 
“mention of weapons” among other analytic parameters employed in her study.  
In an attempt to define the term weapon, one can distinguish between two 
general directions: a broad and a narrow definition. Calhoun and Weston (2016) 
adopt a broad definition, which includes not only the use of firearm, edged 
weapon, bombs, incendiary devices, but also the use of weapon of opportunity 
(loose objects) and the use of fists, feet, or body. Here we shall use the narrow 
definition proposed in Muschalik (2018: 109), i.e. “something (such as a gun, 
knife, club, or bomb) that is used for fighting or attacking someone”. On the 
linguistic level the category includes nominal categories such as names of 
weapons (30) as well as verbal categories referring to actions implying the use of 
weapons (31): 
(30) Tell me what I did wrong, Harry, or I’ll kneecap you with the first bullet.” 
(31) You come back here with twenty large, damn quick, or I shoot your ass 
multiple times. 
Taking into account the fact the we analyse stories and the co‑text is 
available for further analysis, we have decided to split the parameter into 
“explicit use of weapon” and “implicit use of weapon”. The latter category 
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includes cases in which it is evident to the addressee of the threat that the 
threatener is in possession of a weapon and he/she manifests his/her intention to 
use it: 
(32) Let her go. When Oserov maintained his grip, he added, even more quietly, 
Let her go, or I’ll knife you right here. Oserov looked down at the point of 
a switchblade that Arkadin had aimed at his liver. 
5.1.6. FIRST AND SECOND PERSON PRONOUNS 
As threatening represents interpersonal communication, it can be reasonably 
expected that its characteristic feature will be a noticeable use of personal 
pronouns, mainly pronouns referring to the roles of speaker and addressee. 
Within the very act of threatening, the roles of speaker and the addressee are 
likely to be identical with the roles of threatener and target, yet other correlations 
of the roles and pronouns are possible. This view on the high frequency of 1st 
and 2nd person pronouns in threats has found confirmation in the few empirical 
studies reported to date. In Gales’s survey over 30 per cent of her respondents 
expected the 2nd person pronoun (Gales 2010). Also Muschalik (2018) observed 
a high frequency of personal pronouns in her CoJO corpus, with 73% of 
utterances containing 1st person pronoun and 68% – the second person pronoun. 
In the present study, we follow Muschalik (2018), who analysed the 
frequency of 1st and 2nd person pronouns in terms of “four possible combinatory 
patterns and their respective proportion: 1PP‑2PP , 1PP‑no 2PP, no 1PP- 2PP, 
and no 1PP‑no 2PP (95)” (Muschalik 2018: 102). The category of “FIRST AND 
SECOND PERSON PRONOUNS” includes personal, reflexive and possessive pronouns, 
e.g. you, your, yours, yourself/yourselves.  
A note should be taken of the structure of the imperative in the protasis, in 
which the omitted subject is always the 2nd person pronoun you (Quirk et al. 
1985: 828). This leads us to the decision to analyse only the pronouns present or 
absent in the apodosis. The four options are shown below: 
(33) Start having fun or I will not invite you next year. +1PP; +2PP  
(34) Go away, or I will call the police. +1PP; -2PP 
(35) Stop acting like a wild boar with a toothache, or you will need a lawyer. 
+1PP;+ 2PP 
(36) Get away, or they will die. +1PP; -2PP 
5.1.7. AGENCY  
The distribution of personal pronouns as well as the verb type are to a certain 
extent related to the problem of semantic roles in threats. Here we define 
semantic roles as a relationship of a participant with the main verb in a clause and 
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focus on the roles of agent and patient. Accordingly, the agent is understood to be 
“either the [conscious] doer or the causer of the detrimental action specified by the 
violent, ambiguous, or non‑violent verb” (Muschalik 2018:90) whereas the patient 
is the person or thing that undergoes a process, or “is affected by an action perform-
ed by some causer, especially and agent” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 231).  
With the two semantic roles, there are four combinatory patterns: 
(37) Shut up or I’ll burn you. +A; +P 
(38) Don’t be funny, Aaron, or I’ll be forced to withhold sex. +A; -P 
(39) Just know that you need to redirect your investigation, or you will be hurt. 
-A; +P 
(40) Your money or your life. -A; -P 
5.1.8. DIRECTION OF THREAT 
Within this category, Muschalik (2018) codes threats as speaker‑oriented, 
hearer‑oriented, mixed‑oriented, impersonal, or directive. The last of these refers 
to “utterances that implicitly address someone” and express something that can 
be ‘complied’ with”, such as “commands (orders), requests, instructions […] 
advice and permission” (Huddleston 1988: 133). The fact that the object of our 
analysis are IoD threats, whose structure includes a clause with a directive force, 
made us omit this parameter from our study due to its predictability. Instead, we 
propose to analyse the direction of the threat understood after Nini (2017) as the 
direction of harm addressed by a threatener.  
In her analysis of authentic malicious forensic texts Nini proposes four 
categories of direction of harm coinciding with the roles of participants. The first 
category includes threats directed towards a third part, i.e. not the addressee (41). 
The second one refers to threats addressed to both the addressee of the threat and 
a third party (42). Thirdly, she codes threats as directed to the addressee (43). The 
fourth category includes threats to an unknown recipient (44). The four patterns 
are shown below: 
(41) I’ll fuck’em all. 
(42) Come in here or I’ll blow her brains all over this nice marble. 
(43) Drop your weapons or you will all die like your comrades 
(44) This better be important, he vowed, or I will burn whoever is at the 
goddamned door. 
For the same reason as above, namely, that IoDs consist of an imperative 
clause, which provides reference to the addressee, it was essential to modify the 
analytic categories. Moreover, we had to reject Nini’s second category as it 
assumes that the threat can be directed to the addressee in the protasis and the 
violent action towards a third party in the apodosis. Here we concentrate only on 
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apodoses and our final coding scheme involves three options of the DIRECTION OF 
THREAT: (1) the addressee, a third part, and unknown.  
Finally, we decided to analyse the protasis to learn whether the DESIRED 
BEHAVIOUR of the addressee consists in undertaking an action (Do X) or omission 
(Don’t do X). All analytic parameters are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Analytic categories in the CSF 
Parameter Values 
FUTURITY will +/-   
shall +/-   
‘ll +/-   
be going to +/-   
present futurity +/-   
no futurity +/- 
APODOSIS TYPE or I +/-   
or YOU +/-   
or other +/- 
VIOLENT VERB violent +/-   
ambiguous +/-   
non-violent +/- 
TABOO LANGUAGE present/absent +/- 
USE OF WEAPON explicit +/-   
implicit +/-   
no weapon +/- 
FIRST AND SECOND PERSON PRONOUNS (in apodosis) 1st +/-   
2nd +/- 
AGENCY (in apodosis) +Agent; - Patient +/-   
+Agent; - Patient +/+   
Agent - patient -/+   
Agent - patient -/- 
DIRECTION OF THREAT 3rd party +/-   
the addressee +/-   
unknown +/- 
DESIRED BEHAVIOUR IN PROTASIS       
ACTION  Do +/-   
OMISSION  Don’t +/- 
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5.2. Materials and methods 
5.2.1. Data selection 
For our comparative analysis, we gathered a corpus CCF consisting of 700 
English novels written by 243 authors representing crime fiction. “Crime fiction” 
is used here as an umbrella term for a wide variety texts including detective 
fiction, hardboiled fiction, police procedural, forensic crime fiction, legal 
thrillers, and crime thrillers, just to name a few. As presenting the full lists of the 
novels would probably exceed the word limit allowed by this publisher, we will 
only mention a few of them to illustrate the generic variety under investigation. 
The corpus includes among others Stephen King’s Desperation, Insomnia, and 
Firestarter; Robert Ludlum’s Bourne Objectivity, Bourne Ultimatum, and 
Bourne Identity; Tom Clancy’s Red Rabbit, Dead or Alive, and Red Storm 
Rising; Alex Kava’s A Necessary Evil, Frederick Forsyth’s The Day of the 
Jackal, Paula Marantz Cohen’s What Alice knew: a most curious tale of Henry 
James and Jack the Ripper, Nigel Cawthorne’s The most barbaric murderers of 
our times, and Lawrence Block’s The Burglar Who liked to Quote Kipling.  
The CCF consisted of around 76 million tokens (running words) representing 
205, 061 types (distinct words). The shortest of the novels consisted 8, 060 
tokens (2, 106 types) and the longest of 452, 813 tokens (15, 950 types). 
5.2.2. Data analysis 
The basic idea behind the analysis was to detect instances of IoD in the CCF 
and classify them in terms of analytic categories outlined above. As the only 
constant element of IoDs is the conjunction or, which is the 57th most frequent 
word in the CCF with 189, 395 hits, it was necessary to perform multiple 
concordance searches by means of WordSimith Tools 7.0. On the basis of 
examples of IoD‑patterns provided in the literature, we narrowed them to several 
patterns such as “or * you* *”, “or * I *”, “or the *”, “or * we *”, “or * they”, “or 
a*” within 5 words right of “or”. This produced a list of almost 10, 000 
concordance lines, which had to be analysed manually. Concordance lines with 
non‑imperative left‑hand context were generally deleted if the previous co‑text 
did not imply an imperative reading of the element immediately preceding “or”. 
Similarly, the right‑hand NPs followed by a non‑futurate verb form were also 
ignored. This left us with over 4, 000 concordance lines. As there does not exist 
any illocutionary force indicating device for threats, the remaining 4, 000 lines 
were examined in the process of coding, which involved 10 variables discussed 
for each of the threats.  
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The data were analyzed using MS Excel and statistical tools available at 
Social Science Statistics (https://www.socscistatistics.com/) and Wordsmith 
Tools 7.0.  
6. Results 
This section deals with corpus analysis output. The results obtained for each 
parameter will be presented and discussed.  
6.1. PROTASIS/APODOSIS TYPE AND DESIRED BEHAVIOUR IN PROTASIS  
The relatively simple structure of IoD or disjunctive conditionals, which 
consists an imperative clause followed by a declarative one, was not expected to 
produce a large number of patterns. These expectations found confirmation in the 
data gathered during the corpus search.  
The imperative clause was mainly realised by means of subjectless 
imperatives (45), with only a few imperatives with the explicit subject (46): 
(45) Throw down that pistol, or I’ll kill her now! Kill her, and I’ll kill you.  
(46) You come back here with twenty large, damn quick, or I shoot your ass 
multiple times.  
In a few cases, the imperative was expressed by means of verbless 
constructions of formulaic type or as a conventional call to surrender: 
(47) Head down, Underhill said […]. Or I blow you a new hole. 
(48) Hands up or I’ll shoot. 
Of the 790 threat utterances in the CCF, the protasis contained 78 negative 
imperative clauses introduced by do not or don’t and 6 verbless phrases. The 
remaining 706 of the threats represented non‑negated imperatives: 
(49) Speak English at this table or I will fire you so fast you’ll wind up standing 
at the airport wondering how the hell you got from here to there … 
What follows from the distribution of plain and negated imperatives in the 
context of Salgueiro’s (2010: 217) definition of the function of threats is that in 
the CCF the typical protasis refers to a future action rather than omission of an 
action. 
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Although the apodosis clause of Iods was found to be syntactically more 
diverse, for the sake of brevity we reduce our further discussion to the three main 
patterns emerging from the data, namely, or I, or YOU, and or OTHER.  
(50) Don’t come another inch, fellow, or I will pump you,” Floyd said.  
(51) But this is a threat. He moved one step closer. We have you severely 
outnumbered.   
Lay down your weapons or you will have a new answer to my question 
about pain. 
(52) Pay up or the same thing will happen to her. 
These patterns, the proportion of which is shown in Figure 1, were examined 
for the voice of verbs following the subject NPs. In 668 cases of or I patterns, I 
functions as the active subject in the clause and only in one as the passive subject 
(Quirk et al. 1986: 1596) of the clause: 
(53) Leave now. Or I will be compelled to use force. 
Similar results were obtained for or OTHER pattern, where 5 (83%) of 6 
clauses had an active subject, whereas for or YOU the total number of active 
subjects was 109 (95%) in 115 clauses.  
(54) No sooner or you’ll be sent away! 
Figure 1. or I, or YOU, and or OTHER patterns in the apodosis 
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What follows from the data on the proportion of patterns and number of 
types of subject at this stage of analysis is that I, you, and OTHER function 
predominantly as active subjects of the clause. However, it remains to be 
investigated whether the high number of active subjects correlates with the 
semantic role of agent.  
6.2. FUTURITY in IoDs in protasis  
The most frequent expression of futurity (61%) in the CCF data was the 
contracted form ‘ll. The proportion of will was considerably lower (29%). The 
two expressions together make up 90 per cent of all expressions of future in our 
corpus. Present futurate was found in 56 threats (7%). The frequency of shall and 
no futurate is negligible as the two forms add up to 2 per cent. Finally, be going/ 
gonna represents 1.5% (12/790). 
The distribution of futurity is radically different from the results obtained in 
Muschalik (2018: 72). Muschalik found that 71% (213) 53 of the threat 
utterances in CoJO contained a variant of futurity. The remaining 29% (88) of the 
threats had no marker of futurity. If we confine our comparison to variants 
realising only futurity, then the proportions, according to Muschalik (2018: 72), 
were as follows: “54% will (115), 30.9% be going to (66), and 15.1% present 
futurate (32).” 
One obvious source of the striking differences is that Muschalik does not 
analyse IoD as a separate category and her results are derived from the analysis 
of a much broader category of conditionality, a part of which are IoDs.  
Another reason for the discrepancies could be the corpora themselves. While 
Muschalik’s corpus consisted of threats involving life‑threatening scenarios, the 
CCF contains also less serious threats, uttered in a family setting with different 
parameters of power and distance between the participants. 
Thirdly, the dissimilarities in the distribution of futurity in the two corpora 
may follow from the differences in the text type and medium. If we use the 
categories of informative and imaginative text categories proposed by Berglund 
(2005), Muschalik’s threats fall into the broad category of informative texts, 
whereas the CCF represents mainly imaginative texts. In her analysis of 
expressions of future, Berglund (2005:34) observes marked differences between 
the two types:  
To sum up, the Informative hyper‑categories in both corpora are characterised by a high 
proportion of will, and a very low proportion of going to and ’ll, while the distribution of 
will and ’ll is more even in the Imaginative category. 
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With respect to the distribution of the most frequent marker of futurity in the 
CCF, i.e. ‘ll, it is immediately evident that ‘ll strongly favours or I patterns. ‘ll is 
present in 456 of 681 of or I (68.1%) and in only 26 of 115 of o YOU (22.6%). 
The Chi‑square test with Yates correction provides evidence that this difference 
is statistically significant (Chi2 = 79.9632, df = 1, p = .00001 
The frequency of be going to is very low, which is surprising given the fact 
that the frequency of the futurate form has been observed to increase in English. 
In the CCF, be going to collocates almost exclusively with the first person 
pronoun referring to the threatener, as in: 
(55) Drop the gun, or I’m going to shoot you.  
(56) Now do it, or I’m going to fuck you up. 
The semantics of be going to has been extensively described in the literature. 
Klinge (1993) claims that going to refers to a verified state of affairs. For Brisard 
(2001), Leech (1971), and Palmer (1965) it reflects the speaker’s certainty that 
some event will occur. Comrie views going to (1976:64–65) as a “prospective 
aspect”, in which a present state is related to a future situation. In this sense, 
going to is said to be oriented to the present moment (Palmer 1990; Quirk et al. 
1985) in a manner analogous to the Present Perfect.  
The term “orientation towards the present moment” requires a comment. 
Haegeman (1989: 309) argues that going to and will, have the same 
truth‑conditions, but differ in pragmatic import, by which she means differences 
in giving processing instructions: 
(38)  (a) Now we’ll have no bread left for tomorrow’s breakfast.   
(b) Now we’re going to have no bread left for tomorrow’s breakfast. 
(38a) directs the hearer towards the future implications of the proposition 
(i.e. tomorrow’s breakfast) and (38 b) directs him to the present 
implications (i.e. what to do about the situation now).” 
Such a view is most clearly illustrated in (57), in which the present 
implications of be going threat (augmented by the suggestion of the immediacy 
of the action in leave you here) are contrasted with future implications of another 
(‘ll call), temporarily more distant one: 
(57) “You tell me who hired you or I’m going to cut your balls off and leave 
you here to bleed to death. Better yet,” she said, letting go of him, “I’ll call 
some people we know with the Kosovo Liberation Army. I’m sure they 
wouldn’t let you bleed to death; at least not right away.” 
A similar line of argumentation is taken by Muschalik (2018: 142), as she 
explains differences in the distribution of futurity forms in her corpus in terms of 
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a scalar degree of predicative strength, where “will displays the weakest 
predictive strength, be going to displays an increased predictive strength and 
present futurate constitutes the strongest form of prediction.” 
6.3. VIOLENT LANGUAGE  
The results obtained in the data analysis show that violent physical action 
verbs are strongly associated with threatening in crime stories. Violent verbs 
occur in 55.3% of all threats under analysis, which is exactly the same figure as 
in Muschalik (2018). Within the group, the most frequent verb phrases include 
such lexical items as shoot (119), kill (94), die/death (22), break (17), cut (17), 
and fuck (17), as in:  
(62) I was so fucking scared I couldn’t have pulled the trigger no matter what. 
Stop, or I’ll shoot!  
(63) Back off or I’ll kill her. 
The repertoire of violent language in the CCF is very rich and ranges from 
the classic I will kill you to rarer expressions like I shoot his brains out to 
extremely bizarre one as in: 
(64) Now, help Caspar make his shot or I swear to God I’ll pull the top of Naz’s 
skull off with my bare hands and eat her brains for dinner. 
Ambiguous verbs represent 16.4% (as compared to 23% in the CoJO 
corpus). The remaining 28.3% of threats contain nonviolent verbs (23% in the 
CoJO). 
The most frequent expressions in the group of ambiguous verbs, i.e. verbs 
that do not lexicalize a violent meaning, are represented by you’ll be sorry, you’ll 
regret, and phrases in which the speaker commits himself/herself to 
a discontinuation of a previous action: 
(65) Do it now or you’ll be sorry. 
(66) Don’t you lie to me, Leigh West. Or you’ll both regret it. 
6.4. TABOO LANGUAGE 
Taboo expressions are not as frequent as violent language and are found in 
only 23.8 per cent (152 instances) of all threats: 
(67) Now you tell them godless bastards to clear us a path – a wide one – or 
I swear before God   
Almighty, I’ll kill you, Pete. 
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(68) Don’t make me ask you again or you’ll be leaking out through a hole in 
your fucking head. 
By contrast, Muschalik (2018) reports that as many as 144 (47.8%) of the 
301 threats in her corpus met the criteria set for taboo language.  
To explain this discrepancy, it would be useful to refer to what Muschalik 
(2018: 134–35) identifies as two major functions of threat: manipulative and 
retaliative. The former refers to the case in which “a speaker attempts to 
manipulate the target’s actions in the future and the target’s actions in turn 
influence the speaker’s action.” The latter differs from the former in the fact that 
irrespective of the speaker’s attempt to influence the target’s action, “the target’s 
actions no longer influence the speaker’s own actions”, from which she 
concludes that although not an exclusive feature of manipulative threats, 
conditionality is likely to occur more often in manipulative threats than 
retaliative ones. 
Since all instances of threats in the CCF have been found to be of 
manipulative type, it is advisable to compare results obtained only in this section 
of threats. In the CoJO “retaliative threats contain roughly twice as many 
instances of TABOO LANGUAGE as manipulative threats” (Muschalik 2018: 150), 
with 117 instances of TABOO LANGUAGE (38.8%), which, nevertheless, is a figure 
still higher than in the CCF.  
Examples (67) and (68) induced us to ask a question on a possible relation 
between the parameters of VIOLENT LANGUAGE and TABOO LANGUAGE. The overall 
distribution of the two parameters is shown in Figure 2: 
Figure 2. The distribution of VIOLENT LANGUAGE and TABOO LANGUAGE 
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A chi‑square test of independence was performed to examine the relation 
between taboo language and violent language. The relation between these 
variables was significant, X2 (1, N = 660) = 5.9132, p = .015028. This means that 
VIOLENT LANGUAGE use and the use of TABOO LANGUAGE in the CCF are related. 
6.5. USE OF WEAPON  
Results indicate that the use of weapon is relatively frequent in IoD threats. 
Overall, the combined results for the explicit and implicit USE OF WEAPON amount 
to 24.17 per cent, i.e. the mention of a weapon can be found in almost every 
fourth act of threatening by means of IoDs in the CCF.  
Compared with the results obtained in Muschalik’s CoJO (17%), the use of 
weapon in crime stories cannot be said to play a marginal role in the construction 
of threats.  
The mentioning of weapon is accomplished in an overwhelming majority of 
cases by means of shoot (69), agentive verbs lexicalising the concept of weapon 
(70), or verb phrases with nominal forms denoting weapons (71):  
(69) Put both your hands on the top rail of that bottle‑container crate, and you do 
just what I tell you or you’ll get shot again. 
(70) Don’t make a sound, Rapp whispered, his mouth only inches from the 
man’s left ear, or I’ll slit your throat. 
(71) Release me or I’ll put this flare through her head. 
On the lexical level the most frequent patterns are represented by I’ll shoot 
(you) (dead) (right here) stressing the imminence of the execution of a threat.  
6.6. FIRST AND SECOND PERSON PRONOUNS  
In view of the syntactic structure of IoDs, it is not surprising that a high 
frequency of 1st and 2nd person pronouns was observed in the CSF. The numbers 
shown in Figure 3 refer not to the total number of pronouns in apodosis but to the 
total number of apodoses with threats. In threats with multiple occurrences of the 
same pronoun, as in (72), an account was taken only of one form: 
(72) Stay outta this, scumbag, I said. Or I’ll kill you myself. 
It follows that the 1st person pronoun appeared in 85.1% of threats and the 
2nd person pronoun in 72%. This is in agreement with Muschalik’s observation of 
a high frequency of personal pronouns in her corpus, with 73% of utterances 
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containing 1st person pronoun and 68% – the second person pronoun (Muschalik 
2018: 102).  
Even though the total numbers of the 1st and of the 2nd person pronouns are 
broadly similar, their distribution shown in Figure 4 is not regular:  
To examine the relation between the 1st and 2nd person pronouns, a chi‑square 
test of independence was performed. The relation between these variables was 
significant, X2 (1, N = 790) = 156535, p = .000076.  
However, what should be remembered at this point is that Muschalik’s 
analysis of the CoJO was not limited to the apodosis but covered the total 
threatening utterance, whether conditional or not. Consequently, the results are 
not fully comparable. If this analysis is extended to the protasis, then the total 
Figure 3. FIRST AND SECOND PERSON PRONOUNS in the CCF 
Figure 4. The distribution of FIRST AND SECOND PERSON PRONOUNS in the CCF 
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number of the 2nd person pronouns must include almost 800 omitted you‑subject 
of the protasis. This would clearly indicate that the focus of threat IoD utterances 
is on the hearer. In that case what follows from the analysis of the parameter of 
FIRST AND SECOND PERSON PRONOUNS is that the analysis of Iods supports Gales’s 
(2010: 99) (slightly underspecified) claim that “second person pronouns, modals, 
and a time frame occur more often than expected”.  
6.7. AGENT / PATIENT 
The high value of the 1st-2nd person pattern in the threats presented above is 
likely to be indicative of the distribution of patient- and agent roles in the 
apodoses. Figure 5 shows the distribution of four patterns in terms of the 
presence and absence of markers of these two roles. 
The values in Figure 5 differ from the personal values for at least two 
reasons. First, the orientation of the detrimental action is not necessarily towards 
you, i.e. the addressee: 
(72) I said, come here, Tara. Or I’ll kill her. 
(73) But leave Iola alone or I’ll make things happen you won’t like. 
Second, the person to which the 2nd person pronoun refers may function as 
an experiencer rather than a patient (74), an experiencer rather than an agent (75), 
and finally, there are a number of cases in which none of the roles are expressed 
(76): 
Figure 5. The distribution of AGENT and PATIENT roles in apodoses 
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(74) Just don’t let her meet Duggie, I said, or you’ll have no chance. 
(75) Keep your bloody mouth shut, do you hear, or you’ll regret it. 
(76) Cancel the wedding, or the whole parish will know what he has done. 
In her analysis of agent/patient, Muschalik (2018) argues that “threats with 
a manipulative function reside at the vague end of the scale of pragmatic 
explicitness, whereas threats with a retaliative function reside at the explicit end 
of expressing the who‑does‑what‑to‑whom of the action.” The results obtained in 
the CCF seem to imply a different conclusion about IoDs as predominantly 
manipulative threats. Unlike in the distribution of the two semantic roles in the 
CoJO the distribution is not inverted for two extremes observed by Muschalik 
(2018: 147), i.e. both participants explicitly denoted and neither participant 
denoted in the threat. 
To examine the relation between the roles of agent and patient, we used 
a chi‑square test. The relation between these variables was significant. The 
chi‑square statistic is 5.047. The p‑value is .024669. Significant at p < .05. 
6.8. DIRECTION OF THREAT 
Figure 6 provides an overview of the distribution of threats in terms of the 
parameter of direction of threat.  
The results leave no doubt that the most common direction of threats in the 
CCF is the addressee. Of 790 threats analysed here the addressee is clearly 
marked as the target in as many as 707 threats (89.4%): 
Figure 6. DIRECTION OF THREAT 
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(77) Put it down or I’ll beat you to a pulp, I really will! 
Threats directed at a third party come second, yet their contribution amounts 
to only 9.5%: 
(78) Do it or I’ll blow her head off. 
Finally, the target is unspecified in 1% of cases, which follows from the fact 
that in a few cases the apodosis is not complete (79) or the target is hard to 
identify (80): 
(79) Don’t you DARE, or I’ll- 
(80) A sea streak, Henry!” said the devoted brother, reaching into his belt and 
slowly pulling out an automatic. Or I’ll be forced to do something I don’t 
even want to think about. 
The coding parameters applied in this analysis of DIRECTION OF THREAT differ 
from those employed in Muschalik (2018). As the orientation towards the 
addressee is predictable on account of the presence of the imperative clause in 
protasis, our analysis centred on apodoses.  
If protases were included in the analysis, then the total number of 
mixed‑oriented threats (i.e. including the speaker and the hearer) would rise by 
almost 800, which would strongly support Muschalik’s (2018: 148) claim that 
threats with a manipulative function are more focused on the hearer/target than 
retaliative threats. But even without the undeniably addressee‑oriented protases, 
it is readily apparent from Figure 6 that the DIRECTION OF THREAT, as expressed 
solely by apodoses, is also addressee‑oriented.  
7. Conclusions 
In the present paper, we have chosen to take a corpus linguistics 
perspective on one of the most problematic speech acts, i.e. the speech act of 
threatening. The starting point for our research was the claim about the 
centrality of conditionality in the performance of the speech act of threatening, 
a claim repeatedly emphasised in the literature but hardly ever validated in 
empirical studies. Without making a claim about its centrality, we concen-
trated on one particular form of conditional threats known as pseudo-
‑imperatives or Iod (Imperative or Declarative) constructions in a very large 
corpus of crime fiction. Our primary goal was to provide a more complete 
descriptive picture of conditional threats by assessing the place and role of 
IoDs in threatening utterances. Our second goal was to observe whether threats 
in imaginary written communication aspiring to be a representation of real 
communication differ from the authentic threatening language in terms of nine 
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analytic parameters. Following a corpus‑based search and a quantitative 
analysis of the CCF, we went through each analytic parameter to interpret the 
frequency values and what the numbers actually indicated in comparison with 
previous findings reported in the literature. 
It was found that the dominant pattern of apodosis was or I followed by an 
active voice verb phrase which, when combined with the data on the distribution 
of AGENT‑PATIENT parameter, strongly indicates that the CCF threats are 
performed from the perspective of the speaker. This finding differs from the 
results obtained in Muschalik (2018) and Gales (2010). In our view such 
a distribution of patterns in the apodosis can be related to the factor of 
commitment or responsibility of the speaker. In real life situations the 
performance of the speech act of threatening may be subject to criminal liability, 
which, as observed by Muschalik (2018), may lead the threateners to use forms 
that hedge their responsibility such as passive voice, impersonal constructions 
and the like. Criminal story writers seem not to agonize over the consequences of 
their characters’ threats.  
Second, we observed a marked difference in the distribution of FUTURITY. 
While the leading position of futurate forms remained unchallenged, we observed 
a high frequency of ‘ll. forms, which is likely to be attributable to the stylistic 
requirements of criminal fiction involving colloquialization of language.  
Third, while the frequency of VIOLENT VERBS reached the same level as in 
Muschalik (2008), TABOO LANGUAGE is less frequent, even if we restrict our 
comparison to manipulative threats. The reasons behind it can be varied. First, 
the lower frequency may result from a difference in the situations in which the 
threats in Muschalik’s CoJO and our CCF were performed. Unlike the threats in 
the CoJO, all threats in the CCF were produced in spontaneous face‑to‑face 
interaction, in which the emotional attitude of the threatener does not have to be 
manifested through an increased offensiveness of the threats, the more that the 
parameter of USE OF WEAPON attained higher values than in the CoJO. Second, it 
cannot be excluded that the frequency of offensive language is regulated by some 
mechanisms of the genre of crime fiction itself, which we leave here only as 
a pure conjecture. 
We analysed nine different parameters of threats in terms of their presence or 
absence in threat utterances to find that threats employing all dominant values of 
the parameters such as “Stop or I’ll shoot you with this gun, loathsome smelly 
dog” are not common. In most cases, the act of threatening relies upon a selection 
of only a few parameters 
We are aware of the limitations which this analysis suffers. First, we 
concentrated only on one conditional form of threat, namely, pseudo‑imperatives, 
leaving aside the question of the status of “true conditionals” in the CCF. Second, 
by focusing on pseudo‑imperatives, we automatically limited our analysis to 
manipulative threats. Consequently, the picture of the act of threatening in crime 
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fiction that we have drawn must be regarded as fragmentary. Nevertheless, we 
hope that this analysis has led to new insights and demonstrated that further 
larger‑scaled research is desirable. 
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